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Comments
Judicial Self-Defense in the Court
of Public Opinion
I.

INTRODUCTION

Cook County Circuit Judge Lawrence A. Passarella made a fateful decision on February 26, 1986. By acquitting a man accused of
severely beating a Chicago policewoman with a steel bar, Passarella set off a wave of criticism that resulted in his failure to win
retention in the November 1986 general election.' Among the
judge's critics were then-Cook County State's Attorney Richard
M. Daley, who said Passarella showed a "total disregard of the
facts of the case," the Fraternal Order of Police, which organized
an anti-retention campaign, and then-Chicago Police Superintendent Fred Rice. 2
Passarella was not without defenders, however. The Chicago
1. See Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6, 1986, § 2, at 8, col. 5; Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 6,
1986, at 8, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, March 7, 1986, at 11, col. 1; Chicago Tribune,
March 6, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 2. See also Royko, Cops' Verdict on Judge Already in,
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 24, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (police anti-retention effort); Royko,
Justice Can Be So Blissfully Blind, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 9, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (a juror
in another case in which Colella was acquitted reacts to Passarella's ruling); Royko,
Amazing Stories of Face-altering,Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1986, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (discussing another incident involving Michael Colella, the defendant Passarella acquitted,
and imagining how Passarella might view that incident). Passarella's handling of the case
is reportedly being investigated by a federal grand jury. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 5, 1989,
§ 1, at 1, col. 2.
2. See Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 2. Daley added that "[t]his case
again showed what has been happening in [Passarella's] courtroom for a number of
years." Id. Cathy Touhy, the policewoman whose assailant was acquitted, filed a disciplinary complaint against Passarellawith the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board that was
later dismissed. Chicago Sun-Times, March 25, 1986, at 2, col. 6 (complaint filed); City
News Bureau of Chicago, May 12, 1986 (dispatch CNB-55) (complaint dismissed).
Touhy said she filed the complaint "to make sure this doesn't happen to somebody
else.... We would have been justified in killing this man, but we showed restraint. We
relied on the criminal justice system. It failed us." Chicago Sun-Times, March 25, 1986,
at 2, col. 6.
A Mike Royko column on the police effort against Passarella included a policeman's
anonymous comment that the group was doing the judge a favor. "He wants to send
creeps back out on the street? Fine. He can open an office and become a defense attorney," the policeman said. "Then when he gets a creep off the hook, he can charge a fee."
Royko, Cops' Verdict on Judge Already In, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 24, 1986, § 1, at 3, col.
1.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

Bar Association ("CBA") recommended Passarella's retention,3
and several attorneys publicly attested to the judge's ability and
integrity.4 But the most potentially effective defender - Judge
Passarella himself - was silent throughout the controversy. The
judge announced the acquittal without explanation and offered
none later.5 An active public defense by Passarella might have
saved his judgeship, particularly in view of the narrow margin by
which his retention bid failed.6
As evidenced by Judge Passarella's experience, an elected judge
is vulnerable to public criticism. The court system and the rules
that constrict judicial discretion are poorly understood by the average voter.8 Rules restricting the substance and style of a judge's
3. Telephone interview with Terrence Murphy, Executive Director of the CBA. (Oct.
23, 1989). Mr. Murphy explained that the CBA issued a statement expressing the belief
that Passarella tried to follow the law in his ruling. Mr. Murphy also said the CBA
recommended Passarella's retention. Id.
4. Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 2. The article stated that several
attorneys "spoke highly" of Passarella. Id Attorney Keith Davis, former chairman of
the Chicago Council of Lawyers' Criminal Justice Committee, said "Passarella is a fine
judge. He is considered by many to be defense-oriented in the sense he is not biased
toward the state ....
He's a gentleman, and as far as I know, he's as honest as they
come." Id.
5. See Chicago Tribune, March 6, 1986, § 2, at 8, col. 1.
6. Passarella's retention bid was approved by fifty-seven percent of the voters, while
sixty percent approval was needed. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6, 1986, § 2, at 8, ol. 5.
Passarella attempted a comeback in 1988 by writing a letter to Cook County's full circuit
judges asking them to elect him as an associate judge and describing the 1986 campaign
against his retention as "unfair." Chicago Tribune, Oct. 15, 1988, § 1, at 5, col. 2. CBA
President Roy E. Hofer criticized Passarella's campaign as an effort to circumvent the
CBA's screening process for associate judges. Write-in Candidacy Criticized, Chicago
Daily Law Bulletin, Oct. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
7. Former Justice Joseph Grodin of the California Supreme Court, among three
members of that court who lost retention bids in 1986, has observed that the voters decide
whether a judge should be retained based on the results of his rulings. "This is the standard with which voters are most familiar; it is the easiest standard on which to posit
thirty-second television spots; it is also the easiest standard for voters to apply . . ."
Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint:A Judge'sPerspective on JudicialRetention
Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988).
A law professor, writing in the same law review symposium, said "[i]t appears that
judges are inevitably going to be evaluated based on their past or likely rulings on specific,
controversial topics." Chemerinsky, EvaluatingJudicial Candidates,61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1985, 1989 (1988).
8. Judge Nat H. Hentel of the New York Supreme Court, participating in a panel
discussion at an American Judicature Society meeting, said:
The judge's role is clear. He must rule under the law as it is given to him and as
he understands it, without fear of failure. Many good judges have gone down
the drain in the history of this country at election time because they made unpopular rulings which were correct under the law and the public didn't understand it. So it behooves the judge to make sure that his decision is understood
and go completely on the record about it.
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explanation compound the problem. 9 A judge trying to defend a
controversial ruling faces a tough task with a partially tied tongue.
The Passarella situation, with a single controversial decision
provoking a successful anti-retention campaign, was quite unusual.
Nonetheless, criticism of judicial rulings by newspaper columnists, 10 politicians," and others is commonplace. To balance the
Hentel, Judges, Critics and the Public Interest: Balancing Competing Values, 72 JUDICATURE 226, 229 (1989).
Justice Hans A. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has observed:
To most people, law and courts mean criminal law and criminal trials.... Most
judges may see themselves as umpires between the state and the citizen, but
many citizens regard judges as part of law enforcement, and plenty of [judicial]
candidates will offer themselves for that role .... The theme is hard to transfer
to appellate court elections... but it is done nonetheless ... It simply becomes
a matter of luck whose term is up in time to draw the brunt of the most recent
controversy.
Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1995, 2000-01
(1988).
Professor Roy A. Schotland stated the problem more succinctly: "Most Americans
understand far too little about how courts operate, let alone their place in our system."
Schotland, 1986-A Historic Year for Judicial Elections, 70 JUDICATURE 246, 247 (1987).
9. See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text (discussion of Canons 2(A) and
3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct). See also Snyder, The Constitutionality and
Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35
UCLA L. REv. 207, 250 (1987) ("One way to dispel voter ignorance and lack of interest
regarding [judicial] elections would be to remove the shackles placed on candidates by the
Judicial Code and permit them to address the issues that concern the public.")
10. Mike Royko, for example, commonly criticizes judicial rulings he considers outrageous. Prior to the Spring 1990 primary election, Royko wrote a column opposing
Cook County Circuit Judge Leo Holt's appellate court candidacy because Holt acquitted
a man in the death of an 18-month-old girl despite the man's confession to beating the
child. Royko, Voters are the Jury on Holt, Pincham, Chicago Tribune, March 15, 1990,
§ 1, at 3, col. 1. In the same column, Royko criticized R. Eugene Pincham, a former trial
and appellate judge who was then running for Cook County Board President, for freeing
a high percentage of rape and drug defendants while a trial judge. Id. Royko felt defeat
might benefit Pincham because "he could return to law practice and again display his
brilliant talent for getting rapists and drug pushers off the hook." Id. An earlier Royko
column condemned Cook County Circuit Judge Philip Carey's acquittal of a man for the
alleged sexual assault of a sixteen-month-old girl whose rectum was torn in three places.
Royko, Verdict is Clear, But You Be Judge, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 15, 1988, § 1, at 3,
col. 1. Cook County Circuit Judge Donald Joyce was also criticized by Royko after
Joyce convicted a man, who shot his wife in the face, of aggravated battery instead of
attempted murder. Royko, You are the Jury on Judge Joyce, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4,
1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
11. A year before the Passarella controversy, Cook County Circuit Judge E.C. Johnson faced similar criticism for acquitting on bribery charges an attorney who allegedly
solicited $7,000 from a client to fix a rape case. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 26, 1985, § 1 at 1,
col. 1. Johnson held that the attorney's solicitation of the bribe did not violate Illinois
law because lawyers are allowed to receive money from clients. Id. The lead prosecutor
in the bribery case called the acquittal "the most outrageous, incredible ruling I have ever
seen." Id. The prosecutor's boss, Cook County State's Attorney Richard M. Daley, held
a press conference four days later to condemn Johnson's ruling. Chicago Tribune, Jan.
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dialogue, judicial participation is essential.
This Comment will discuss the problems judges face when confronted by public criticism and will offer suggestions for dealing
with these problems. First, this Comment will cover the two most
applicable provisions in the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2(A), requiring judges to promote public confidence in the
courts' "integrity and impartiality,"' 12 and Canon 3(A)(6), barring
judges from publicly commenting on "pending or impending"
cases.' 3 Recent cases from other states that interpret or apply
these canons will then be examined.' 4 Next, this Comment will
consider the role of bar groups in view of guidelines for publicly
defending judges set forth by the American Bar Association
("ABA"), Illinois State Bar Association ("ISBA"), and Illinois
Judges Association ("IJA"). Finally, this Comment will conclude
that Illinois judges have substantial freedom to respond publicly to
criticism, and it will suggest ways to exercise that freedom.
II.

THE ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct govern the tone and substance of comments by Illinois judges on par30, 1985, § 2, at 3, col. 1. "Apparently everyone but Judge Johnson knows that it's a
crime for a lawyer to shake down a client for a bribe," Daley said. Id.
12. ILL. S. CT. R. 62(A), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62(A) (1987). Canon 2(A)
provides: "A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary." Id.
13. ILL. S. CT. R. 63(A)(6), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 63(A)(6) (1987). Canon 3(A)(6) provides: "A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of
court personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit
judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court." Id.
14. The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court
effective January 1, 1987, is based on the American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct adopted in 1972. See ILL. S. CT. R. 61, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 61
(Smith-Hurd 1989) (Background and Committee Comments preceding Rule 61). Fortyseven states (all but Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin), the District of Columbia,
and the Federal Judicial Conference have adopted judicial conduct codes based on the
ABA Code. J. SHAMAN, S. LUBET & J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHics 4,
n. 18 (1990). It was largely adopted in Illinois to promote national uniformity and expand
the body of caselaw and other materials that Illinois judges could consult for guidance.
ILL. S. CT. R. 61, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A,para. 61 (Smith-Hurd 1989) (Committee
Comments preceding Rule 61). Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(6) of the Illinois Code were taken
verbatim from the ABA Code and are therefore identical to the same-numbered canons
in many other state codes. Id. (Committee Comments following Canons 2 and 3). For
purposes of convenience, this Comment refers to these Canons without specifying the
particular state judicial conduct codes from which they are drawn.
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ticular cases, made on or off the bench.15 Canon 2(A) states that
"[a] judge should ...conduct himself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary."' 6 Canon 2, in essence, reminds judges that they represent a branch of government that should appear disinterested,
calm, and rational regardless of the circumstances. To promote
that image, judges should keep their emotions and biases in check
at all times, expect "constant public scrutiny," and accept restrictions that an "ordinary citizen" might find "burdensome." !7
Public comments by judges are more specifically governed by
Canon 3(A)(6), which states that comments concerning "a pending
or impending proceeding in any court" should be avoided., The
Canon, however, allows public statements in the course of judges'
official duties or to explain court procedures.' 9 Much of the Illinois Code, including Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(6), was taken verbatim
from the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, making the reporter's
notes to the ABA code 20 a source of additional guidance. The
15. ILL. S. CT. R. 62(A), 63(A)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, paras. 62(A), 63(A)(6)
(1987).
16. ILL. S. CT. R. 62(A), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 62(A) (1987). Canon 2(A)
overlaps Canon 1, which states that "[an independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.... The provisions of this Code should be construed
and applied to further that objective." ILL. S. CT. R. 61, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A,
para. 61 (1987). The Committee Comments for Canon 2 state that "irresponsible or
improper" judicial conduct erodes public confidence. ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 10A, para. 62, (Smith-Hurd 1989) (Committee Comments).
17. ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 62 (Committee Comments)
(Smith-Hurd 1989). See also Matter of Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 711, 378 N.E.2d 669, 685
(1978) ("A judge, particularly a chief justice [of the superior court], must be sensitive to
the impression which his conduct creates in the minds of the public .... He has failed to
perceive that the public often does not distinguish between a chief justice as a judge and a
chief justice as a person.")
18. ILL. S. CT. R. 63(A)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 63(A)(6) (1987).
19. Id. The Committee Comments state, in reference to pending matters, that a judge
should only discuss "matters of public record, such as the filing of documents, and should
not comment on a controversy.., which could come before him." Id. (Committee Comments). Canon 3(A)(6) has been modified, and redesignated as Canon 3B(9), in the new
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct that is expected to be submitted to the ABA
House of Delegates at its 1990 midyear meeting. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
3B(9) (1990) (Final Draft Nov. 1989). The proposed new provision states in part that
"[a] judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any
public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its
fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair
trial or hearing ....
This Section does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a
litigant in a personal capacity." Id. The Comments to the proposed new provision state
that the ban on pending cases "continues during any appellate process and until final
disposition." Id. (Committee Comments).
20. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973). See
supra note 14 regarding adoption of the ABA code in Illinois.
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notes on Canon 3(A)(6) advise that statements from the bench concerning pending proceedings are permissible because they fall
within a judge's duties. 21 Furthermore, the notes state that court
personnel may release public information on pending or impending
proceedings.22
The commentary to the Illinois Code and the ABA reporter's
notes thus make clear that a judge can attempt to correct factual
inaccuracies in news reports about pending cases, provided the
facts involved are of public record.2 3 The judge also can inform
news reporters about events in open court, either orally, in writing,
or through other court personnel.24 It is important to note that
Canon 3(A)(6) does not affect judicial speech from the bench.25
Thus, judges can respond to criticism in open court or in written
opinions, as long as the proper tone is maintained pursuant to Canon 2(A).26
Problems arise when judges express their views on the merits of
pending cases outside the courtroom 27 or when the views are expressed in an intemperate or otherwise improper manner. 2 Recent
caselaw from other states illuminates these problems.
III.

RECENT COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING CANONS

AND

2(A)

3(A)(6)

Decisions on the propriety of judges publicly defending their judicial conduct or rulings are rare nationally, and none have come
from the Illinois Courts Commission, which has exclusive authority to discipline Illinois judges. 29 The few available decisions are
21. Id. at 55.
22. Id. at 55-56.
23. ILL. S. CT. R. 63, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10OA, para. 63 (Committee Comments)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); E. THODE, supra note 20, at 55-56.
24. ILL. S. CT. R. 63, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63 (Committee Comments)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); E. THODE, supra note 20, at 55-56.
25. ILL. S. CT. R. 63, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 63 (Committee Comments)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); E. THODE, supra note 20, at 55-56.
26. ILL. S. Cr. R. 62(A), 63(A)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10OA, paras. 62(A), 63(A)(6)
(1987).
27. See infra notes 62-98 and accompanying text (discussion of relevant cases).
28. See infra notes 33-38, 47-53, 77-85 and accompanying text (discussion of relevant
cases).
29. Disciplinary complaints against Illinois judges are brought by the Judicial Inquiry Board. ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 15(b)-(d). The complaints are heard by the Courts
Commission, comprised by five state judges: one supreme court justice, two appellate
court justices, and two circuit court judges. Id. art. VI, § 15(e)-(g). The Illinois Supreme
Court has no power to review decisions of the Courts Commission. Id. art. VI, § 15(f).
Illinois is among only three states in which the highest state court has no role in the
judicial discipline process. See Wassenberg, A Search for Accountability: Judicial Disci-
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instructive, however, and should have considerable precedential
value with the Courts Commission.30
Some of the decisions recognize that a judge has a limited right
to respond to attacks by fellow judges or lawyers. 3 1 Other decisions establish that judges must avoid comments on the merits of
pending cases regardless of whether the comments were provoked
or unprovoked.32
A.

Responding to Attacks

The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized a judge's right to explain his side of a public controversy in its 1988 decision in In re
Miera.3 3 In that case, Judge Alberto Miera received an one-year
suspension for sexually harassing his male court reporter and other
misconduct. 34 The court reporter had won a civil verdict against
Miera that prompted several of the judge's fellow county judges to
pass a resolution calling for his removal from the bench.35 When a
news reporter called for his reaction, Miera said his colleagues
were "blood-thirsty hypocrites"; this statement was later broadcast
on local television.36 The Minnesota Supreme Court found Miera's
"outburst ... at least understandable" in view of his fellow judges'
conduct, including the judges' public comments about Miera and
their in-chambers party to celebrate the court reporter's verdict
against Miera.37 The court further found that although "a more
careful, reasoned" response would have been preferable, Miera's
comments did not constitute "an unprovoked, disrespectful attack
on the judiciary. "38
The Miera decision is particularly significant for its adoption of
the dissenting view in a 1970 Florida case, In re Kelly,39 which held
that a judge under attack by colleagues possesses a "qualified privilege" to explain his side publicly "in moderate, unmalicious, and
pline Under the JudicialArticle of the 1970 Illinois State Constitution, 8 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 781, 782 (1988) (historical overview of the Illinois judicial discipline system and an
analysis of the Courts Commission's authority).
30. See supra note 14 (applicability of judicial discipline rulings from other states in
Illinois).
31. See infra notes 33-46, 54-61 and accompanying text (discussion of relevant cases).
32. See infra notes 62-98 and accompanying text (discussion of relevant cases).
33. 426 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1988).
34. Id. at 859.
35. Id. at 853.
36. Id. at 856.
37. Id. at 857.
38. Id.
39. 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 962 (1971).
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unabusive language."' Kelly involved a presiding circuit judge,
Richard A. Kelly, who had ordered a series of administrative
changes that antagonized other judges of the circuit.4 A majority
of the circuit's judges voted to remove Kelly from the leadership
position, prompting Kelly's resignation.42 About ten days later,
and with ample notice to the press, Kelly filed a court reform petition with the circuit clerk's office that sharply criticized his fellow
circuit judges for their inefficient handling of criminal cases and
their refusal to adopt new procedures. 43 The tone and public nature of the petition resulted in a 4-3 Florida Supreme Court decision publicly reprimanding Kelly." The Kelly dissenters, led by
Florida's chief justice, argued that Kelly had "an untrammeled
right" under the first amendment to the federal constitution to
present his side of the dispute with his fellow judges publicly. 4 The
dissent argued that, as an elected judge, Kelly had justification to
defend his reputation publicly.4
40. Miera, 426 N.W.2d at 857 (citing Kelly, 238 So. 2d at 575 (Ervin, C.J.,
dissenting)).
41. Kelly, 238 So. 2d at 566-67. Judge Kelly demanded changes in the handling of
criminal cases, temporarily transferred a new judge to a county away from his home,
planned to transfer all domestic relations cases to one judge, proposed ending the use of
special masters in uncontested divorce cases, and directed the official court reporter to
report justice of the peace proceedings when requested by a county public defender. Id.
The Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, whose report the Florida Supreme
Court reviewed, found that Kelly's plans were presented in a manner that created dissension and confusion. Id.
42. Id. at 567.
43. Id. Kelly's petition asserted in part that the "simple expediency" of appointing
public defenders earlier, which resulted in a large reduction in the number of jail prisoners, was not accepted without "crisis, controversy and ill-will among the judges," and
that "[v]ast and important and much needed judicial reforms await only the interest and
action by the judges of this circuit." Id.
44. Id. at 574. The majority held Kelly was motivated more by a desire for "personal
notoriety" and political benefit, than for court reform and directed Kelly to cooperate
with his fellow judges on future reform efforts. Id. at 573-74.
45. Id. at 575 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). See also Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline
and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181, 1225-50 (1986) (arguing that
Canons 2(A) and 3(A)(6) are not constitutionally overbroad on their face but must be
confined to their purposes, i.e., ensuring fair trials and maintaining public confidence in
the judiciary, to avoid unconstitutional applications); Comment, FirstAmendment Rights
of Attorneys and Judges in JudicialElection Campaigns, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 219 (1986)
(judicial candidates should have the same free speech rights as elected officials and attorneys generally).
46. Kelly, 238 So. 2d at 575 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting). "Certainly [Kelly] a judge periodically subjected to the elective process to retain his judgeship, had cause to feel aggrieved by the turn of events that affected his public stature.., and in the constitutional
scheme of free expression could seek... [to] justify to the public his side of the affair and
did not have to stand mute under the circumstances merely because he is a judge." Id.
Twelve years after Kelly, the Florida Supreme Court recognized a judge's general right
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In McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
California Supreme Court adopted the public explanation exception originated in Kelly but added a caveat that, regardless of the
provocation, a judge must avoid "personal hostility" in his response to criticism.4" Shortly after James J. McCartney, a former
prosecutor, became a judge in January 1971, the local public defender's office established a policy of filing affidavits of prejudice
against McCartney in all trials, and later expanded the policy to
include all proceedings in which McCartney could exercise judicial
discretion.49 McCartney responded in court with loud, angry denunciations of the public defender's office, once telling a deputy
public defender:
I'm not going to be pushed around by the Public Defender's Office and the abuse and the perversion that they have engaged
themselves in emasculating an elected official of the people.
And if you're ready to do it, I'll meet you anywhere, any time,
any place, buddy, up to the United States Supreme Court, back
down again to the court of public opinion....
This thing is being abused badly, and I'm not about to stand
for it, and I'll fight it every time, every place, every comer where
justice will permit me to do it. 50
McCartney sought to defend his outbursts as a reasonable response to the effort to keep McCartney from presiding over any
criminal cases. 5 The California Supreme Court rejected this defense because reasoning that even if the public defender's office acted contemptuously, a judge must always avoid "expressions of
personal hostility" and can never defend his character in a manner
to criticize or protest the state of the law "as long as he does not appear to substitute his
concept of what the law ought to be for what the law actually is, and as long as he
expresses himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in his integrity and impartiality as a judge." In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla.
1982). In Gridley, a judge wrote a pair of letters to an Orlando newspaper and an article
in an Episcopal church newsletter opposing capital punishment. Id. He was cleared on
Canon 2(A) charges because the letters and article caused no apparent prejudice or loss of
public confidence. Id. at 954-55.
47. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974).
48. Id. at 538-39, 526 P.2d at 287, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 279. The alleged misconduct in
McCartney took place prior to adoption of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and California's incorporation of that code. Although the case predates Canon 2(A), it provides a
useful discussion of limits on a judge's "self-defense" rights.
49. Id. at 538 n.13, 526 P.2d at 286 n.13, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 278 n.13. The affidavits
automatically disqualify the judge under California law. Id. at 531-32, 526 P.2d at 28182, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
50. Id. at 524 n.8, 526 P.2d at 277 n.8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 269 n.8 (quotation taken
from finding on Count III(D)).
51. Id. at 537, 526 P.2d at 286, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
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that undermines public respect for the law. 5 2 McCartney was53censured for his angry responses and various other misconduct.
Seven years after McCartney, the California Supreme Court further explored a judge's right to public self-defense in Wenger v.
Commission on JudicialPerformance.54 In Wenger, Justice Court
Judge Jerrold L. Wenger was removed from the bench for extensive misconduct, 55 but was cleared of an alleged Canon 3(A)(6) violation for his critical comments about a superior court decision
freeing a man Wenger had jailed for direct contempt. 56 Wenger
criticized the release at length to a news reporter, stating in part,
"[tlo divest justice court judges of the dignity and ability to control
this potentially explosive environment is to strip away the underlying foundations originally built into these courts .... This decision
undoubtedly undermines the entire judicial structure on the lower
levels, the people's courts.""
The California Supreme Court held that Wenger's comments did
not violate Canon 3(A)(6) because the contempt proceeding was no
longer pending. 8 The court then addressed the tone of Wenger's
comments. Wenger had submitted an ethics opinion stating that
the California Code of Judicial Conduct allows judges to make a
"dignified response to public criticism"; the court ruled Wenger
did not exceed that privilege. 59 The court added that although
Wenger's comments misrepresented the narrow basis of the supe52. Id. at 538-39, 526 P.2d at 287, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 279 ("No matter how provocative are the personal attacks or innuendoes by lawyers against a judge, the judge simply
'should not himself give vent to personal spleen or respond to a personal grievance' because 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice'.") (quoting Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.)).
53. Id. at 540, 526 P.2d at 288, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 280. The other misconduct included
intemperate outbursts against or bullying of attorneys, pro se defendants, another judge
and other court personnel, inefficient handling of cases, and failing to adhere to the judicial function. Id. at 522-23, 526 P.2d at 275, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
54. 29 Cal. 3d 615, 630 P.2d 954, 175 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1981).
55. Id. at 620, 630 P.2d at 955-56, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22. Wenger was removed for
interfering in matters from which he had been disqualified, attempting to dissuade an
attorney from representing a specific defendant, abusing his contempt power, and improperly banishing a prosecutor from his court. Id. at 622, 652-53, 630 P.2d at 956-57,
975, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 422-23, 441.
56. Id. at 635, 630 P.2d at 965, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
57. Id. at 635, 630 P.2d at 964-65, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31.
.58. Id. at 635, 630 P.2d at 965, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
59. Id. at 635-36, 630 P.2d at 965, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 431. " '[N]othing in the Code of
Judicial Conduct prevents a judge from making a dignified response to public criticism
except as related to a case pending or about to be brought before the court.'" Id. (quoting Conference of California Judges, Commission on Judicial Ethics, Op. 24 (March 27,
1976). The court did not mention Canons 1 and 2, that govern the tone of judicial
speech, but instead cited CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c), which similarly forbids "conduct
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nor court decision voiding the contempt citation, 6 0 no prejudice to
61
the court system occurred under the circumstances.
B.

Commenting on Pending Cases

In addition, a judge must avoid discussing the merits of pending
cases, as a recent California opinion, Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, demonstrates. 6 2 The Ryan court removed Mu-

nicipal Court Judge Richard Ryan from the bench based on over a
dozen acts of misconduct, one of which involved comments to the
press about three ongoing cases. 63 Regarding one case, Ryan explained his written opinion before it was published to a news reporter, and the newspaper published his comments before the
parties learned of his decision. 64 Ryan also commented to the press
about a contempt order he entered against an attorney while the
order was on appeal. 65 Ryan held the attorney in contempt because he allegedly disparaged Ryan in court.6 6 Ryan later told a
newspaper he was going to drop the contempt charge but defended
the charge, saying in part:
I was told [the attorney] was really out of line, but since there
was something negative said about me ...I don't want to appear
biased and will let another judge decide. . . [i]t's not proper for
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute."
Id. at 636, 630 P.2d at 965, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
60. The superior court judge who voided the contempt citation found that the allegedly contemptuous conduct was invited by Wenger's bailiff. Id.
61. Id. The only further explanation offered by the court was a quotation from
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) referring to "a practice familiar in the
long history of Anglo-American litigation, whereby unsuccessful litigants and lawyers
give vent to their disappointment in tavern or press." Wenger, 29 Cal. 3d at 636, 630
P.2d at 965, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 431. Although the court apparently thought it acceptable
for a judge to blow off a little steam after being overruled, Judge Wenger's other instances
of misconduct sufficed to warrant his removal from the bench. Id. at 441, 630 P.2d at
975, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
62. 45 Cal. 3d 518, 754 P.2d 724, 247 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1988).
63. Id. at 542-44, 547, 754 P.2d at 738-39, 741, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93, 395. Ryan
was cleared of a charge regarding a fourth pending case because his remarks were made
from the bench while the press was present. Id. at 544, 754 P.2d at 738-39, 247 Cal.
Rptr. at 393. Among other offenses, Ryan's misconduct included abusing his contempt
power, imposing an improper sentence for driving-under-the-influence that he supported
with a fabricated justification, urging a prosecutor to bring a more serious charge against
a defendant, directing a collateral investigation that prejudiced a criminal defendant, infringing upon defendants' rights to counsel, and telling offensive jokes to female lawyers.
Id. at 531-45, 754 P.2d at 731-40, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 385-94.
64. Id. at 542, 754 P.2d at 738, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
65. Id. at 543, 754 P.2d at 738, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
66. Id. at 531-32, 754 P.2d at 731, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Although Ryan was not in
court at the time, the attorney allegedly made these comments before Ryan's clerk. Id.
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loud, derogatory statements to [be] made
67 in front of the whole
courtroom as soon as the judge leaves.
In a third case, Ryan imposed an improperly harsh sentence for
driving-under-the-influence. After he refused to explain the sentence in court, Ryan told a local newspaper that the sentence was
intended to discourage jury trials and "there had to be some incentive not to go to trial. ' 6 The California Supreme Court held that
in each of the three pending cases, Ryan's comments violated Canon 3(A)(6) and constituted prejudicial conduct.69
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the appearance of
prejudice caused by comments on pending cases in Matter of Benoit.70 Judge John W. Benoit, Jr., in response to a higher court
decision vacating sentences he imposed in nine criminal cases and
remanding the cases for resentencing, wrote a letter to four Maine
newspapers criticizing the higher court's decision. 71 Benoit's
widely published letter defended the original sentences, discussed
the factors that produced them, and stated "I have asked the
Maine attorney general to seek a review" of the decision.72
Maine's supreme court held that the letter violated Canon 3(A)(6),
suspended Benoit for a week, fined him $1,000 and ordered him to
take an ethics course.7 3 Canon 3(A)(6), the court observed, bars a
judge from "publicly prejudging" or appearing to prejudge any aspect of a pending case.74 The court stated it was "difficult to conceive of a more egregious violation" than Benoit's letter.75 The
letter clearly showed Benoit's bias, made the judicial system appear
unfair, and subjected the defendants facing resentencing to a "pub67. Id. at 543, 754 P.2d at 738, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
68. Id. at 534, 754 P.2d at 732-33, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87. Ryan also improperly
defended the sentence in a letter to the local newspaper's editor. Id. at 544, 754 P.2d at
739, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
69. Id. at 543-44, 754 P.2d at 738-39, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 393. With regard to pending
cases, the California Commission on Judicial Performance stated that "it is entirely improper for a judge to use the media either as a platform or as a method of responding to
criticism." Also, it found that some litigants were prejudiced and the press reacted unfavorably to some of Ryan's comments. Id. at 542, 754 P.2d at 738, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
The California Supreme Court largely adopted the Commission's findings without further
comment. Id. at 542-44, 754 P.2d at 738-39, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
70. 523 A.2d 1381 (Me. 1987).
71. Id. at 1382.
72. Id. at 1382, 1384. The attorney for the defendants facing resentencing notified
the State Committee on Judicial Responsibility and Disability of the letter and sought
Benoit's recusal, which Benoit granted. Id. at 1382.
73. Id. at 1384-85.
74. Id. at 1383.
75. Id.
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lic prejudgment." 76
A similar concern about public confidence guided the Texas
State Commission on Judicial Conduct in its November 1989 order
censuring Judge Jack Hampton for publicly explaining a thirtyyear prison sentence while a motion for a new trial was pending
before him." The judge imposed the sentence on an alleged double
murderer who, accompanied by several friends, picked up a pair of
gay men outside a bar and drove them to a park, where the gay
men were killed with multiple gunshots.7 8 In a December 1988
interview with a Dallas newspaper reporter, Judge Hampton gave
the following explanations for the relatively light sentence:
These two gays that got killed wouldn't have been killed if they
hadn't been cruising the streets picking up teenage boys.
I don't much care for queers cruising the streets picking up
teenage boys. I've got a teenage boy....
Some murder victims are less innocent in their deaths than
others. In those cases a defendant is unlikely to deserve a maximum sentence.
I put prostitutes and gays at about the same level. If these
boys had picked up two prostitutes and taken them to the woods
and killed them, I'd consider that a similar case.
And I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a
prostitute.
Just spell my name right ... [i]f it makes anyone mad they'll
forget it by 1990. 79
On the heels of the newspaper interview, Hampton made the following remarks in a telephone interview with an Associated Press
reporter:
The victims were homosexuals. They were out in the homosexual area picking up teenage boys. Had they not been out there
trying to spread AIDS around, they'd still be alive today. I hope
that's clear. This is an eighteen-year-old boy. He had thirty
years in prison. You know that's a pretty heavy punishment for
a kid that's never done anything wrong before. . . I've been
prosecuting since 1955. Defending, I defended cases twenty

76. Id.
77. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 52, Order of Public Censure of Morris Jackson
Hampton, Judge, 238th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas, Texas, slip op. at 3-4 (Tex. State Comm'n
on Judicial Conduct Nov. 27, 1989).

78. See Hahn, Conduct Commission Must Not Condone Anti-Gay Statements, Tex.
Lawyer, Nov. 13, 1989, at 24, col. 1 (opinion column discussing facts of the murder case
and urging the Commission on Judicial Conduct to reject a special master's finding that
Judge Hampton would be impartial in any case involving homosexuals).
79. Censure of Hampton, slip op. at 1-2.
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years. I've been judging them for seven years and any sentence
that I do is a sum total of thirty-three years experience in crimi-

nal law and it does not upset me if anybody in the Gay Alliance
disagrees with me.' °
The Commission on Judicial Conduct found Judge Hampton's
comments violated Canon 3(A)(8) of the Texas Code of Judicial
Conduct.8 ' Because the new trial motion was then pending and the
judge's interview with the newspaper reporter lasted from thirty to
forty-five minutes, it went well beyond an explanation of court procedures. 2 The Commission stated that to condone such a lengthy,
off-the-bench discussion of a judge's findings and rationale would
be to approve of "the use of off-record, extra-judicial considerations" in the judicial process and would diminish "[p]erceptions of
fairness. ' s3 Regarding Canon 2(A), the Commission noted that
the disciplinary case record contained substantial evidence that the
public responded to the judge's comments with "disbelief, abhorrence and indignation."" Consequently, the Commission ruled
that Judge Hampton violated Canon 2(A) because his comments
damaged public confidence in judicial integrity and impartiality. 5
Judges are permitted to provide background information on
pending cases to news reporters.8 6 Care must be taken to avoid
discussing the merits, as illustrated by an Alabama Supreme Court
decision, Matter of Sheffield. 7 The court suspended Judge Billy
Joe Sheffield for two months, without pay, because he commented
on the merits of a pending contempt case, and he failed to recuse
himself from the matter.8 8 The judge had initiated the contempt
proceeding against a woman who wrote a letter to a small-town
newspaper criticizing the judge, though not by name, for releasing
a man from jail who failed to make child support and maintenance
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 4. Texas Canon 3(A)(8) is almost identical to Canon 3(A)(6) of the Illinois
Code and the ABA Code, prohibiting out-of-court comments on pending cases. See id. at
3; ILL. S. CT. R. 63(A)(6), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 63(A)(6) (Canon 3(AX6)
and Committee Comments) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
82. Censure of Hampton, slip op. at 3.
83. Id. at 3.
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 3. The special master who conducted a hearing on the matter found that
Judge Hampton's comments did not violate Canon 2(A) because the judge would be impartial in cases with homosexuals or prostitutes as victims. Id. at 2. The Commission on
Judicial Conduct emphatically disagreed. Id. at 3-4.
86. See supra notes 13, 18-26 and accompanying text (discussion of Canon 3(A)(6)).
87. 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984).
88. Id. at 355-56, 359. The judge was cleared of a related charge for making the
improper contempt finding because there was no clear and convincing evidence that he
made the finding in bad faith. Id. at 358-59.
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In a telephone interview with a newspaper editor the night
before the contempt hearing, the judge said "[t]he contempt speaks
for itself . . . I think it's pretty obvious who she is talking
about.... Just because she doesn't name any names doesn't lessen
what's been done."' The judge also said the letter had "false information in it" and suggested the editor "might want to look at
the libel laws; call an attorney."91 The next day the judge found
the letter 92writer in contempt but rescinded the contempt order a
day later.
The Alabama Supreme Court began its discussion by quoting
from a National Conference of State Trial Judges report urging
judges to provide the news media with background information on
pending cases. 93 The court observed that judges are prohibited
from commenting publicly on the merits but are encouraged to
give abstract explanations of pending cases. 94 "Obviously, judges
walk a fine line between the duties and prohibitions of Canon
3(A)(6)." 91 It added that "the risk of being misquoted" may stop
many judges from talking to the press. 96 The court then rejected
Judge Sheffield's claim that he merely provided "abstract legal explications." 97 Instead, it concluded clear and convincing evidence
supported a finding that the judge commented on the merits during
89. Id. at 352. The letter stated in part that the unnamed judge:
feels justified in coming into office and changing another judge's decision. He
says that a man can sign all of his resources over to another person, let that
person handle his finances, give him money as he needs or wants it and not be
Every woman in Henry and Houston
liable of [sic] supporting his family ....
Counties had better sit up and take notice of this situation. The next time it
could be one of you.
Id.
90. Id. at 353.
91. Id.
92. Id. The judge researched contempt law and the "clear and present danger" doctrine, realized the contempt order was erroneous, and rescinded the order on his own
initiative. Id. Accounts and criticism of the contempt proceeding appeared in newspapers around the nation including The New York Times, The Bakersfield Californian and
The Syracuse Post Standard. Id.
93. Id. at 355 (" 'Often there is no one, other than the judge, who is in a position to
give a detailed and impartial explanation of the case to the news media' ") (quoting Nat'l
Conference of State Trial Judges Comm. on News Reporting and Fair Trial, Judicial
Guidelines for Dealing with News Media Inquiries and Criticism (5th Draft, June 5,
1984)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the telephone interview in violation of Canon 3(A)(6). 98
01 all support a judge's
Miera,99 the Kelly dissent, l°0 and Wenger 1
right to respond to public criticism. As McCartney10 2 emphasizes,
however, any responses must be calm and reasoned. Moreover, the
merits of pending cases must be avoided, as Ryan, 0 3 Benoit,1" 4
Hampton,105 and Sheffield 1°6 admonish. As Justice William 0.
Douglas observed, judges should be "men of fortitude, able to
thrive in a hardy climate."1 7 Thus, instead of responding personally to criticism, some judges might prefer to let a local bar association respond on their behalf.
IV.

THE BAR ASSOCIATIONS

Sometimes, local bar associations will come to the aid of judges
under public attack. 10 Bar intervention is sporadic, however, and
may often be less effective than a judge's self-defense. 9 The ABA
issued a pamphlet in 1986 that urged state and local bar groups to
develop plans to respond to unfair or inaccurate criticism of judges
or the courts. '10 The Illinois State Bar Association previously is98.

Id. Judges cannot avoid discipline by keeping their comments to a journalist "off

the record" until after a trial is completed. See In re Hayes, 541 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1989).
In Hayes, a Florida judge stipulated that he violated Canons 1, 2, and 3(A)(6) when he
made observations about a murder trial over which he was presiding to a journalist,
whom the judge knew would later use the observations in a published account of the trial.
The judge received a public reprimand. Id. at 105-06.
99. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (Miera discussion).
100. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (Kelly discussion).
101. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (Wenger discussion).
102. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (McCartney discussion).
103. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (Ryan discussion).
104. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (Benoit discussion).
105. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (Hampton discussion).
.106. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (Sheffield discussion).
107. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).
108. See, e.g., Council of Lawyers has Greylord Backlash Plan, Chicago Daily Law
Bulletin, June 15, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (the Chicago Council of Lawyers, expecting voters to
retaliate generally against judges for the Operation Greylord court corruption scandal,
announced a plan to distribute sample ballots with the group's judicial evaluations); Bar
Group Assails Daley's Complaint Against Judge, Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at 24,
col. 4 (the Cook County Bar Association accused Cook County State's Attorney Richard
M. Daley of unethical conduct because he publicly denounced, and filed a judicial disciplinary complaint against, a criminal court judge, E.C. Johnson, who had just acquitted
an attorney charged with bribery. The IJA also planned to denounce Daley's filing of the
disciplinary complaint).
109. See Wapner, How We Can Develop a Better Working Relationship with the Press,
25 JUDGES' J. 6, at 47 (Winter 1986) ("the bar associations sometimes do, and sometimes
don't" answer criticism on behalf of judges).
110. A.B.A. SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNJUST CRITICISM OF THE BENCH, COURTS AND
COMMUNITY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION LAWYERS CONFER-
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sued a similar set of guidelines for local bar use in 1982111 based on
a policy statement issued by the IJA." 2 The ABA pamphlet explains that "inaccurate or unjust criticism of judges, courts, or our
system of justice ...erodes public confidence. '"'1 3 The ABA pamphlet urges lawyers and bar associations to respond to unjust criticism because judicial responses might seem undignified, selfsuch responses
serving or lacking in credibility. Furthermore,
11 4
might interfere with pending litigation.
Essentially, the ABA and ISBA guidelines list the same factors
for deciding when and how bar groups should become involved."'
For example, under both guidelines involvement should be considered only if the criticism is serious, materially inaccurate, or reflects adversely on the judiciary as a whole." 6 The ABA and ISBA
guidelines advise that generally bar responses are inappropriate
when the criticism is fair comment, vague, based on innuendo,
when a lengthy investigation is needed to explore the facts, or
when a judicial discipline complaint is likely to be filed." 7 Both
the ABA and ISBA guidelines recommend concise, informative,
non-argumentative responses issued within forty-eight hours of the
criticism if possible. I8
The Illinois Judges Association has a policy similar to those
urged by the ABA and ISBA, but with an added feature: the group
tries to enlist the support of bar groups or law professors for any
Unjust Criticism of Judges (1986). The pamphlet also offers guidelines for implementing such plans.
111. ILL. ST. B.A., Model ProgramAgainst UnwarrantedCriticism of Judges (1982).
The CBA has no set policy but publicly defends or criticizes judicial rulings on a case-bycase basis. Telephone interview with Terrence Murphy, Executive Director, CBA (Oct.
23, 1989).
112. ILL. JUDGES A., A Program of the Illinois Judges Association for Meeting Inaccurate and Unjust Criticism of Courts and Judges (1981), excerpts reprinted in 69 ILL.
B.J. 336 (1981) (based on policy statements by judges' groups in California and Washington state and on an ABA Committee's draft report).
113. Unjust Criticism, supra note 110, at 1.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3-4; ISBA Model Program, supra note 111, app. at 1.
116. Unjust Criticism,supra note 110, at 3-4; ISBA Model Program, supra note 111,
app. at 1.
117. Unjust Criticism, supra note 110, at 4; ISBA Model Program, supra note 111,
app. at 1-2.
118. Unjust Criticism,supra note 110, at 5-6, ISBA Model Program, supra note 111,
app. at 2-3. A pair of attorneys involved in bar responses warned that taking substantive
positions will cost at least half the potential audience, and late responses may either be
"no longer newsworthy or may rekindle the controversy by republishing the original
charge." Schoenbaum and Goldspiel, Answering Unjust Criticism-FirstAid for Battered
Courts, 21 JUDGES J. 39, 40 (Fall 1982).
ENCE,
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response.' 19 Although members of the Judges Association may be
able to respond faster by themselves, the group considered important the participation of other segments of the legal profession to
give the public a more accurate view of the judicial function. 20
Although bar associations play an important role in defending
the courts' public image, several gaps in that role are probably unavoidable. The bar groups' reluctance to intervene in situations involving innuendo or potential disciplinary
action is
understandable. It is often difficult to find the source of innuendo
and refute it effectively. Moreover, to the extent the innuendo involves a judge's personal life, the judge will be in a much better
position to know the facts and to respond quickly. Potential disciplinary situations may require extensive investigations, and bar
groups should not appear to be prejudging a disciplinary proceeding. Innuendo or the threat of a disciplinary action can cause great
damage to a judge's reputation, however, particularly if no rebuttal
is made quickly. Even in less delicate circumstances, however, the
bar groups may simply decide the criticism is not serious, or bar
groups may be among the critics.' 2' Moreover, a bar group's aid
may come too late, after the public focus has shifted elsewhere.
Given these gaps in bar groups assistance, judges may often find
it desirable to assume primary responsibility for their own public
defense and rely on the bar for occasional backup assistance. This
approach is commendable because only the judge knows why he
issued a particular ruling. His explanation may be the most credible and may draw the most attention. After all, it is often the
judge who becomes the center of controversy. Once the case concludes, a judge can address the merits in ways that bar associations
119. UIA Program, supra note 112, at 1.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., CBA Rejects EvaluationAppeal, Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Sept. 14,
1988, at 1, col. 2 (the CBA refused to reconsider its "not recommended" rating of Cook
County Circuit Judge Jill K. McNulty, a criminal division supervising judge, during a
period in which her immediate superior and several judges below her engaged in court
corruption, resulting in federal Operation Greylord convictions. The CBA evaluation of
McNulty said that although it knew of no evidence indicating she was corrupt, she "exercised poor judgment" by failing to aggressively investigate and take ameliorative steps);
Two Groups of Lawyers Lash Out at Retention of Five Judges, Chicago Tribune, June 25,
1987, § 2, at 2, col. 2 (the CBA and Chicago Council of Lawyers criticized Cook
County's 173 full circuit judges for re-electing five associate judges against the recommendations of both bar groups; four other associate judges whom the bar groups opposed
were denied re-election); Eight Judges Don't Rate with Bar Group, Chicago Tribune, Oct.
8, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 5 (the Council of Lawyers declared that eight Cook County circuit
judges seeking retention were unqualified; one was said to have an "erratic, sometimes
bullying demeanor," and another was viewed as "close-minded . . . indecisive and
dilatory.")
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are unable or unwilling to do. Consequently, in many situations, a
judge can mount a more effective public defense than bar
associations.
V.

ANALYSIS

Judges are often faced with the prospect of making a controversial ruling, such as acquitting a notorious criminal defendant, fining a municipality whose officials refuse to obey a court order, or
striking down a popular law. 122 Then, when elected judges confront voters, they are highly motivated to explain and justify their
rulings. The public also has an earnest interest in obtaining the
information needed to evaluate a controversial ruling. Such information provides the basis for rational decisions regarding whether
judges deserve to be retained. Fortunately, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and case law provide considerable leeway for judges to
respond to criticism and explain their rulings, either on, or off, the
bench.
A.

In-Court Explanations and Written Opinions
In-court explanations and written opinions provide judges with
the greatest freedom from the restraints of Canon 3(A)(6). 123 Both
modes of expression permit a timely discussion of a ruling's merits.
Providing thorough oral or written opinions may also help prevent
inaccurate or incomplete news accounts, thereby reducing criticism
based on misconceptions. Moreover, a judge can respond to criticism by supplying a copy of the ruling to the media 124 or by adres122. See, e.g., Second Federal Judge Rejects Law Against Burning the Flag, N.Y.
Times, March 6, 1990, at A20, col. 1 (a Washington, D.C. federal court judge held the
Federal Flag Protection Act of 1989, which criminalized burning the U.S. flag, unconstitutional; the previous week, a federal judge in Seattle also voided the act on First Amendment grounds).
123. ILL. S. Cr. R. 63(A)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 63(A)(6) (1987). See
supra notes 13, 18-26 and accompanying text (Canon 3(A)(6) discussion).
124. Judge Frank Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stood by his written opinion when an unsuccessful appellant's attorney, Northwestern University law professor Anthony D'Amato, made a speech claiming that Easterbrook altered or omitted important facts in the case. D'Amato represented John M.
Branion Jr., a Chicago physician, in an effort to overturn Branion's conviction for the
1967 murder of his wife. The Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous July 1988 opinion written
by Easterbrook, affirmed a lower court's denial of Branion's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1645
(1989). During an October 1989 speech, D'Amato asserted that Easterbrook engaged in
an "artful" distortion of the facts to justify ruling against the obviously innocent Branion.
D'Amato, The Ultimate Injustice: When a Court Misstates the Facts (paper delivered at
the Cardozo Law School, Oct. 2, 1989) (scheduled for publication in the Cardozo Law
Review). Asked for his reaction, Easterbrook declined comment, saying "[i]t
would be a
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sing it in his next ruling, if the case remains pending.
Judge Milton I. Shadur of the U.S. District Court in Chicago
demonstrated the latter technique in September 1989. Shadur responded to politicians' and journalists' criticism of $1,000 a day
contempt fines he imposed against Cook County for overcrowding
at the county jail. 125 In an opinion ordering the parties to submit
mistake, and anything I said couldn't possibly come out right. I put a long time into
writing that opinion. Whatever I have to say, right or wrong, is already in it."
Margolick, A Law Professor with a Beef Takes the Judge to Task and the Case to the
Public, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, at B5, col. 1.
125. Shadur began imposing the fines in early 1989 for violations of a 1982 consent
decree and a 1983 order setting a 4,500 inmate limit for the County jail. Pursuant to the
consent decree, the County agreed not to overcrowd the county jail. County JailFines
May Get Personal,Chicago Tribune, Sept. 16, 1989, § 1, at 5, col. 5; Release ofInmates to
Go on, Chicago Tribune, March 20, 1984, § 2, at 1, col 2.
County officials, in an effort to comply with the 4,500-inmate limit, sought bail reductions for 340 inmates in February 1983, but the wholesale approach was resisted by Cook
County Circuit Court judges. Judges Balk on Plan to Cut Crowding at Jail, Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 11, 1983, § 2, at 1, col. 2. Presiding Circuit Judge Gino DiVito of the
County's preliminary hearing courts said "[ijf Judge Shadur truly believes these people
should be dismissed from jail on a wholesale basis... he can exercise his discretion to do
so." Id.
In March 1985, Cook County State's Attorney Richard M. Daley urged Shadur to
modify the inmate limit because the resultant release of allegedly dangerous felons posed
an immediate threat to public safety. Keep Suspects Jailed,Daley Says, Chicago Tribune,
March 26, 1985, § 2, at 4, col. 4. Daley said the issue was "whether the temporary
comfort of jail inmates takes priority over the safety of our community." Id. Shadur
responded in court two days later, calling it "a mistaken viewpoint that to create constitutional living conditions is to be soft on criminals and soft on crime. That is dead
wrong." Judge Assails County Inaction on Jail Crowding, Chicago Tribune, March 28,
1985, § 2, at 1, col. 2. Another two days later, Shadur denied the motion to raise the
inmate limit. Inmate Double-ceilingRejected, Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1985, § 1, at
5, col. 2.
By the Fall of 1988, over 100 jail inmates were sometimes forced to sleep on mattresses
on the floor, a violation of Shadur's 1983 order requiring a bed for each inmate. Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 12, 1988, § 2, at 3, col. 5. Mike Royko observed that Shadur's objection to
mattresses on the floor would seem strange to the Japanese, who commonly sleep on
futons on the floor. Royko, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie-Even on Cots, Chicago Tribune, Feb.
14, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 1. Royko wrote that Shadur "probably hasn't been mugged lately
or his car hasn't been stolen. However, the judge has made it more likely that you or I
will be mugged or that our car will be stolen in the near future." Id. Royko's solution
was to transfer the jail overcrowding case to a judge of Japanese ancestry, and appoint
Shadur ambassador to Japan. Id.
Chicago Police Superintendent LeRoy Martin suggested that Shadur visit city neighborhoods with high crime rates to "see the conditions people live under," and said "overcrowding in the jail doesn't bother me... I say put the two bums in the same cell, put
four of them in there. Sleep in shifts." Martin:Let County Inmate 'Bums'Sleep in Shifts,
Chicago Tribune, April 21, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
Television commentator Walter Jacobson joined the chorus in May 1989, observing
that "[t]hieves and thugs are getting arrested, and they check-in and check-out, because
the judge (Milton Shadur) does not want them in there too uncomfortable.... Of course,
[Shadur] lives in a suburb on the north shore." Walter JacobsonPerspective (WBBM-TV
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memoranda on the future course of the fifteen-year-old litigation
over jail conditions, Shadur explained the basis for the fines and
26
analyzed the public relations situation.1
Initially, Shadur noted that, as a federal judge with lifetime tenure, he could "render justice without concern as to public perceptions (or more frequently misperceptions) of the decisions
involved."' 27 Nonetheless, he added, public perceptions are important, and the media has a "special responsibility" to provide accurate information.' 2 Shadur continued, saying "[i]t is therefore
especially regrettable when media representatives prefer to feed un29
reasoning prejudices rather than to deal with the real issues."'
The misinformation served to focus attention on the judge rather
than the County board, where responsibility for the jail problem
lies. 130
The freedom to make in-court explanations is limited, however.
Such explanations, like those made out of court, are governed by
Canon 2(A) and its requirement that judges maintain the appearance of impartiality, honesty and dignity.' 3 ' In this regard, judges
must refrain from attacks against specific critics because such attacks may appear to be the basis of a personal feud. For example,
in McCartney,132 the judge exacerbated his problem with the public
defender's office by angrily attacking the office in court. The attack
made it clear that, at least from that point on, the public defender's
office would have problems with the judge and should avoid him.
broadcast, May 23, 1989). Two months later, Jacobson urged Shadur to allow the jail to
use the fine money to buy monitoring bracelets that would enable jail officials to keep
track of inmates released because of the overcrowding. Walter Jacobson Perspective
(WBBM-TV broadcast, August 21, 1989). Jacobson followed up the next month by suggesting that Fort Sheridan, a U.S. Army base slated to close in neighboring Lake County,
could be used to temporarily hold some of the Cook County Jail's overflow prisoners.
Walter Jacobson Perspective (WBBM-TV broadcast, Sept. 13, 1989). In court, Shadur
described the suggestion as "thoughtless though perhaps well intended." Duran v.
O'Grady, No. 74 C 2949, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1989). Jacobson then unsuccessfully sought an explanation from Shadur over the telephone and surmised that
Shadur opposed Fort Sheridan as a temporary jail because the base was near Shadur's
home. Walter Jacobson Perspective (WBBM-TV broadcast, Sept. 18, 1989).
126. Duran v. O'Grady, No. 74 C 2949 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10989).
127. Id., slip op. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-3.
131. ILL. S. CT. R. 62(A), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 62(A) (1987). See supra
notes 12, 16-17 and accompanying text (Canon 2(A) discussion).
132. 12 Cal. 3d 512, 526 P.2d 268, 116 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1974). See supra notes 47-53
and accompanying text (McCartney discussion).
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The better approach would have been for the judge to note the
existence of the public defender's policy of disqualifying the judge
and to state that he found the policy difficult to understand. A
quiet, behind-the-scenes approach to defending the judge's reputation within the legal community would have been preferable to an
angry, in-court counterattack. The judge might have responded
more effectively by meeting privately with the public defender.
Moreover, a public response may have been unnecessary if the general public was unaware of the judge's dispute with the public
defender.
Higher courts should never be directly attacked, as the
Wenger 133 and Benoit 131 cases illustrate. If a case is reversed and

remanded, the judge will have a chance to expound the merits and
justify his reasoning in court when the case returns. Only then
should the judge respond. If the case has concluded, the judge may
be able to respond out of court. In either situation, any response
should emphasize the facts that were initially before the judge.
Clearly, it is unwise to create even the appearance of a feud by
accusing the higher court of undermining a judge's authority, as
occurred in Wenger,135 or urging
a litigant to seek review of a re36
versal, as occurred in Benoit.1

B.

PromotingAccurate News Coverage

Judges also can take an active role in promoting accurate news
coverage. Joseph A. Wapner of the "People's Court," a former
California trial court judge, has stated that because many reporters
lack expertise about the court system, judges have a responsibility
to provide background information and clear explanations of rulings. 13 When inaccurate or misleading reports appear, judges
should write a letter to the editor
or otherwise seek to straighten
138
the record, Wapner advised.

133. 29 Cal. 3d 615, 630 P.2d 954, 175 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1981). See supra notes 54-61
and accompanying text (Wenger discussion).
134. 523 A.2d 1381 (Me. 1987). See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (Benoit discussion).
135. 29 Cal. 3d at 635, 630 P.2d at 964-65, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31.
136. 523 A.2d at 1384.
137. Wapner, supra note 109, at 8. New York Supreme Court Judge Nat H. Hentel,
noting that the National Judicial College has for several years urged judges to dine regularly with newspersons, said "[i]t's not a matter of kissing anybody's behind, but the
judge takes the responsibility of educating the journalists as to what is going on and uses
them as the surrogate to pass it on to the public, which misunderstands most judicial
processes." Hentel, supra note 8, at 231.
138. Wapner, supra note 109, at 47-48.
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Open lines of communication between judges and news reporters
are beneficial to both groups, 3 9 however, they are not without pitfalls. Judges who give such interviews might be tempted to comment on the merits of pending cases' 40 and could be misquouted.
A discussion of the merits can be avoided by keeping to the facts
and law and by omitting even the obvious inferences. A judge
should simply let the media or attorneys make such inferences.
The risk of being misquoted can be largely eliminated by answering
questions in writing, perhaps by making available opinions or other
documents containing the desired background information, or by
having other court personnel, such as a bailiff or secretary, answer
reporters' questions. Once a judge becomes accustomed to dealing
with press inquiries, it should be easy to keep the proper bounds in
mind.
Speaking off-the-record to reporters should be avoided because
mistakes may result. A reporter's promise not to publish the
judge's comments or not to attribute statements to the judge may
entice him to discuss the merits. Canon 3(A)(6), however, certainly prohibits this approach.' 4 1 Moreover, even the most trustworthy reporter might inadvertently mix off-the-record comments
with other information and publish some off-the-record material.
It is more prudent to give reporters only information that the ethics rules permit the judge to publish.
C.

Off-the-bench Comments

Occasionally, a judge may need to step out of his judicial role
and defend himself. He may face pointed, well-publicized criticism
and find it necessary to respond while the controversy remains in
the public eye. As with in-court responses, a judge should emphasize the facts and avoid attacking specific critics. It is also important to avoid inflammatory rhetoric or disparaging comments
139. See Drechsel, Judicial Selection and Trial Judge-JournalistInteraction in Two
States, 10 JusT. Sys. J. 6 (1985). Judges in Minnesota, which elects its judges, were
found to be more likely to cooperate with press inquiries than judges in a state with an
appointive system. Id. at 11. A 1980 survey of Minnesota trial judges indicated that
niney-five percent of the judges would explain legal processes to journalists, ninety-four
percent were willing to be interviewed for stories about the courts, and eighty-six percent
would explain at least some aspects of their rulings to journalists. Id.
140. See, e.g., Matter of Sheffield 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984). See supra notes 87-98
and accompanying text (Sheffield discussion).
141. ILL. S. CT. R. 63(A)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 63(A)(6) (1987). See
supra notes 13, 18-26 and accompanying text (Canon 3(A)(6) discussion); see also supra
note 98 (discussion of a case on off-the-record comments).
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about racial, religious, sexual or ethnic groups. In In re Miera,1 "2
for example, the judge whose colleagues had publicly called for his
removal might have responded by describing them as insensitive
instead of "blood thirsty hypocrites. ' 143 Or the judge might have
simply told inquiring journalists that he has tried not to allow personal criticism to affect his judicial rulings and will continue to do
his best in the future.
Out-of-court responses can take various forms such as sending
out a written press release, holding a press conference, or telephoning individual reporters. A judge who wants his response to be
heard should, nonetheless, refrain from appearing overly aggressive. Consequently, a press release may often be the most desirable
response. It is much easier to appear calm in a written release than
in a live session with reporters. If reporters call for a response, the
judge or other court personnel can read the release over the phone.
Whatever form a response takes, it should be carefully thought
through in advance. A judge should be mindful of the facts that
are in the public record and whether the case remains pending in
any court. Based upon these considerations, the judge can determine and stay within the limits defined for extrajudicial
communications.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Illinois' elected judges are particularly vulnerable to public criticism, but they need not stand mute in response. The Illinois Code
of Judicial Conduct allows judges to respond in court or in written
opinions as long as the responses are dignified. The Code also permits appropriate out-of-court responses as long as the merits of
pending cases are avoided. A judge can often meet criticism effectively by showing factual errors or omissions in the criticism, without directly questioning the critic's character or motives. Written
opinions, which can be used as a vehicle for responses in cases that
remain pending before a judge, are especially useful because they
allow judges to explain the rationale of controversial rulings in a
calm, reasoned manner. Local bar associations will sometimes
come to the aid of beleaguered judges, but judges cannot completely rely on the bar in this regard. Bar groups might decide not
to defend a judge under attack, might take too long to respond, or
might be among the judge's critics. Therefore, an effective public
defense of a judge will often require the judge's active participa142.
143.

See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (Miera discussion).
See id.
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tion. A judge should consider using his freedom to respond to criticism when his reputation and judicial career are at stake.
SETH KABERON

